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Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a complex phenomenon. This neurodevelopmental condition
is characterized by a hallmark of impairments in social interaction, communication, and restricted
activity. Neurocognitive studies in the last three decades provide important insights regarding the
pathological development, and the complexity of the ASD condition (Frith, 1989; Belmonte et al.,
2004; Baron-Cohen, 2006; Happe and Frith, 2006; Markram andMarkram, 2010; Philip et al., 2012;
Schore, 2013; Tang et al., 2014; Hahamy et al., 2015).
In this opinion, I discuss the frontal integration model of ASD (Ben Shalom, 2009), as a
simplified model for understanding autism. I begin by a brief sketch of Ben Shalom’s model.
Then, I make links between Ben Shalom’s model and central neurocognitive theories. I suggest that
these novel links mutually elaborate both Ben Shalom’s original account as well as these theories.
This elaboration offers a three-dimension model that is consistent with frameworks that address
neuropsychoanalytic developments in autism, such as developmental deficits in forging a unitary
sense-of-self (Schore, 2013).
According to the frontal integration model of ASD (Ben Shalom, 2009), neurocognitive
processing can be divided into three-levels: (1) a basic-level involving primary cognitive, emotional,
and sensorimotor processing. For example, a loud unexpected sound that is perceived in primary
auditory-sensory systems might trigger physiological emotional-responses, such as, fear (fast heart
beats, etc.). (2) an integrative-level, that combines the output of all primary processes from the
basic-level, and forms a global-coherent meaning, experience, or behavior. For example, the mental
representation of the various primary elements that constitute the fear emotional response results
in a conscious feeling of being afraid. (3) a logical-level, which forms abstract logical rules (if-then
rules) from the basic-level. For example, “if I have fast heart beats and cold sweat, then I might
be afraid.” This three level architecture is applied to four general psychological domains: emotion,
memory, sensation-perception, motor.
Ben Shalom (2009) argues that some core ASD abnormalities are the result of deficits in medial-
prefrontal cortex. These deficits are manifested in impairments in level-2 integrative-processes,
which are essential for abilities, such as theory of mind (TOM), emotional-regulation and motor-
planning. Moreover, this model suggests that intact level-3 logical-processes, can access level-
1 basic-processes, and compensate for the deficits in level-2 integrative-processes. This type of
compensation may assist ASD individuals in understanding and coping with the world around
them. For example, an ASD individual with deficits in level-2 integrative-processes may fail feeling
typical empathy toward a sad person. However, the ASD individual may rely on intact level-3
processes in order to recognize the emotional state, by forming a logical if-then rule, such as “if
a person is crying, then he might be sad.” Nevertheless, this compensatory logical mechanism
cannot fully cover for the core deficits in level-2 integrative processes. For example, in the absence
of integrative-intuitive abilities, such as TOM, compensatory rule-based thinking and behavior
often appears rigid and unflexible, accompanied with problems in understanding nuances of
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complex social situations. Consider an ASD individual that tries
to apply the rule: “if someone said something that made others
laugh then it is a joke, and I should laugh too.” While in
this situation this ASD individual might laugh, he may not
understand why the joke was funny, or may be somewhat
confused if some people appear to be crying because they wipe
tears from their eyes.
Several existing theories of ASD can be linked to key
elements in Ben Shalom’s (2009) model. First, the idea that ASD
abnormalities relate to deficits in integrative-processes, aligns
with the central-coherence theory (Frith, 1989; Happe and Booth,
2008). According to this theory, ASD individuals display weak
central-coherence, that is, a reduction in integrative-processes
that pull together large amounts of information into coherent
wholes. This theory rests on early concepts of the Gestalt
movement, which claimed that perceptual organization is the
result of a top-down configuration of the whole, rather than a
bottom-up sum of its parts. That is, “the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts” (Aristotle). The weak central-coherence theory
is supported by numerous studies showing that ASD individuals
present better local-processing than global-processing. That is,
greater ability to segment the whole design into its component
parts, but impaired ability to perceive an integrated-coherent
whole (i.e., not seeing the forest for the trees).
Ben Shalom’s (2009) idea of impaired integrative-processes
is not only consistent with the central-coherence theory, but it
can also enrich it, by suggesting that weak central coherence
is not limited to perceptual organization, but rather it can also
be seen in three other psychological domains: emotion (e.g.,
deficits in forming integrative-conscious feelings to self or other),
memory (e.g., deficits in the integrative-processes that constitute
episodic memory, such as the ability to mentally travel back in
time during recollection), and motor (e.g., deficits in integrating
basic information from several modalities required for motor
planning).
Second, Ben Shalom’s premise of deficits in level-2 integrative-
processes together with compensatory level-3 logical-processes
is also congruent with the empathizing-systemizing (E-S)
theory (Baron-Cohen, 2006). According to this account, ASD
individuals show deficits in empathizing (i.e., hypo-empathizing),
and an intact or superior ability in systemizing (i.e., hyper-
systemizing). The term empathizing encompasses a range of
terms, including TOM, and empathy (Baron-Cohen, 2004, 2006).
Specifically, ASD deficits in empathizing, often linked to the
medial-prefrontal cortex (Baron-Cohen and Belmonte, 2005),
are consistent with Ben Shalom’s ideas of medial-prefrontal
cortex deficits in level-2 integrative-processes. Moreover, the E-S
theory suggests that deficits in empathizing may range in severity
(Baron-Cohen, 2006), and as such it extends Ben Shalom’s model
that concentrates on a general dysfunctionality.
Furthermore, the ASD systemizing idea suggested by the E-
S theory (Baron-Cohen, 2006), aligns with Ben Shalom’s idea
of logical rule-based thinking (level-3). According to this idea,
systemizing involves the formation of rules that are based on
examining whether repeated application of a particular operation
to a certain input, leads to a similar output. This theory posits
that the human brain’s ability to systemize can vary along eight
different levels, from hypo-systemizing (low or non-ability to
formulate rules), to hyper-systemizing (high ability to analyze and
formulate rules).
Hyper-systemizing at the highest level may represent an
outstanding unique ability, such as phenomenal ability to
calculate numbers, or to analyze and compose music—
i.e., savant-abilities. It has been also suggested, that savant-
abilities operate by directly accessing low-level, less-processed
information that exists in all human brains, but is not normally
available to conscious awareness (Snyder, 2009). This idea
supports Ben Shalom’s suggestion regarding level-3 logical-
processes that can compensate for deficits in level-2 integrative-
processes, by accessing level-1 basic-processes.
Ben Shalom’s idea that rule-based processing may interact
with basic-processing, is consistent with the E-S theory that
relates hyper-systemizing to an increased basic sensory sensitivity
(Baron-Cohen, 2006). In this sense, the E-S theory expands Ben
Shalom’s model by suggesting that ASD abnormalities are not
exclusively related to level-2, and can also be seen in level-1
basic-processes. These level-1 deficits may present different types
of abnormalities, such as sensory hyper-sensitivity (e.g., covering
ears against loud, unexpected sounds) and hypo-sensitivity (e.g.,
failure to react to pain) (Kern et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2007;
Ben-Sasson et al., 2009; Lane et al., 2010; Lloyd et al., 2013).
Third, level-1 deficits in ASD are consistent with the intense
world theory (Markram and Markram, 2010). According to this
theory, hyper-functioning, that is, high-local connectivity within
neural assemblies (Belmonte et al., 2004), may lead to excessive
flow of information from sensory areas to higher integration
areas, causing overload that can lead to intense experiences, and
fragmented understanding of the world (Markram andMarkram,
2010).
The integration between Ben Shalom’s (2009) model and
the aforementioned central neurocognitive theories, suggests
that ASD abnormalities can be related to each level of Ben
Shalom’s model (1-basic, 2-integrative, 3-logical), and each
level can be seen as a broad dimension that holds multiple
types of processes that can vary in their functionalities.
Furthermore, different potential deficits within each dimension,
deficits between interacting dimensions as well as compensation
between dimensions, demonstrate the complexity of the autism
spectrum condition. For example, within the basic-dimension
a differential profile of sensorimotor deficits can include
hyper/hypo-sensitivity in auditory, visual, tactile, smell, somatic,
and vestibular processes. These differential basic-dimension
deficits may interact with different types of global-integration
process deficits in the integrative-dimension, and with different
types of compensatory high-cognitive processes in the logical-
dimension (e.g., high ability to formulate rules).
This hierarchical three-dimensional model also aligns with
neuropsychoanalysis frameworks that address the developmental
pathology of social-emotional skills in autism. According
to the regulation theory, the bi-directional mother-infant
emotional-communication serves as a mutual psychobiological
emotion-regulation process that is the basis of all later social-
emotional skills (Schore, 2013). These mother-infant mutual
interpersonal emotion-regulation processes begin with early
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unconscious emotional communications that are based on
primary sensorimotor processes (e.g., visual-facial, auditory-
prosodic, tactile-gestural). Later in development, these basic
interpersonal regulatory processes become more holistically
integrated, enabling the emergence of intrapersonal self-
regulation and a coherent sense-of-self (Schore, 2013; Schore and
Schore, 2014).
The regulation theory suggests that the infant’s social-
emotional development is manifested in a hierarchical
development of interconnected right-brain-limbic areas.
For example, in the basic-dimension, the right amygdala,
which is functional at birth, is responsible for various
rudimentary elements of emotional-communication, such
as production/recognition and arousal-regulation. Importantly,
the right amygdala, which is characterized as “a hub of a network”
(Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2011), forms novel connections
with multiple integrative self-regulatory regions including the
right anterior-cingulate, and the right orbitofrontal cortex. These
regions are responsible for integrative-intuitive assessment of
complex social situations (Schore, 2013).
The regulation theory posits that basic mother-infant
emotional-communication can either facilitate or inhibit
the maturation of the infant’s self-regulatory processes and
social-emotional skills (Schore, 2013). In this sense, deficits in
the infant’s basic-dimension, such as hyper-aroused amygdala
(Schumann et al., 2009), and hyper/hypo-sensitivity in primary
sensorimotor processes (Ben-Sasson et al., 2009; Lane et al.,
2010; Lloyd et al., 2013), may relate to an intense dysregulated
emotional state (Markram and Markram, 2010), in which
mother-infant sensorimotor emotional-communication is
disrupted. These disruptions result in deficits in the infant’s
integrative dimension development. Deficits between these
interacting dimensions, may explain the autistic infant’s
dissociative withdrawal from the intense emotional world
around him (Markram and Markram, 2010; Schore, 2013), and
the autistic’s need for sameness of environment and activities.
According to the three-dimensional model, repetitive
activities may relate to different deficits and compensatory
processes within and between dimensions. This illustrates the
idea that Ben Shalom’s model is non-deterministic, allowing
different etiologies to similar symptoms. For example, echolalia
(i.e., repetition of phrases, words or parts of words), may serve a
self-regulatory function (Prizant and Duchan, 1981), by helping
ASD children gain control over their experience when there is
intense sensory-emotional arousal in the basic-dimension. At the
same time, echolalia may also relate to compensatory processes
in the logical-dimension, because repetitions are needed to
formulate logical-rules, or serve as a way of communication
(Prizant and Duchan, 1981), as if saying “I heard what you said,
and I’m still processing it.”
Thinking in these three-dimensions offers a simplified
model that may help in understanding autism across different
theoretical frameworks and therapeutic techniques. For
example, addressing the basic-dimension and assessing primary
sensorimotor processes are most important when assisting the
infant or the child to regulate (or work around) his emotional-
sensorimotor experience. These intense emotional-sensorimotor
experiences may relate to bodily terrors in the autistic psychic
experience, such as “liquefying/burning/freezing,” and “losing
part of the body,” when experiencing physical separation from the
caregivers (Tustin, 1972, 1986). Early intervention, that facilitate
mother-infant social-emotional communication, and mental
connections between emotions, feelings, thoughts, sensations
and behavior, may facilitate neural connections (Sullivan et al.,
2014). Moreover, assessing the logical-dimension, and nurturing
rule-based abilities that can compensate for impairments in the
integrative-dimension, may help ASD individual to cope better
in their surroundings and even excel in their fields of interest.
This opinion invites researchers and clinicians to further
elaborate this three-dimensional model. Addressing distinct
profiles of deficits within and between dimensions may help to
assess and assist the developmental course of ASD individuals.
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